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LAW SCHOOL COMVIENCEMENT.
The Law School Commencement was
held on the evening of Tuesday, June 5th,
beginning at 8 P. .r There were thirtyfour who receive4 degrees, as follows:
THREE-YEAH COUiRSE.

George W. Aubrey,
B. Frank Fenton,
A. Frank John,
Charles H. Meyer,
John G. Miller,
Miles H. Murr,
Robert H. Smith,
Robert P. Stewart,
Walter Taylor.
TWO-YEAR COURSE.

Jasper Alexander,
G. Arthur Bolte,
Louis P. Coblentz,
Harry M. Collins,
Lloyd L. Frank,
William B. Gery,
Howard M. Harpel,
George Heist,
Oliver Lentz,
Sara McBride Marvel,
James B. O'Keefe,
Leon C. Prince,
Charles A. Piper,
Ernest Robitaille,
Wilson S. Rothermel,

Horatio W. Russell,
Michael J. Ryan,
Lawrence M. Sebring,
W. Ernest Shaffer,
William T. Stauffer,
A. Newton Wallace,
H. Stanley Winlack,
W. Brooke Yeager.
The following was the order of the exercises :
Overture-' 'Silver Bell."
Address-"The Law and the Lawyer's
Sphere,"
Robert Hays Smith, -Oakville, Pa.
Selection-"Rustic Lass."
Baccalaureate Address,
Hon. Geo G. Reynolds, LL. D.,
New York City.
Selection-"Mazurka."
Conferring of Degrees.
Awarding of Prizes.
Selection-Two-Step, from "The Singing
Girl."
The music was by the Dickinson Orchestra.
The address by Mr. Smith was generally
conceded to have been one of the best
student efforts in the history of the Law
School. It is printed in full in this number of THE FORUM.
The Baccalaureate Address by Judge
George Greenwood Reynolds, of Brooklyn,
N. Y., was on the subject, "Trial by
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Jury." The subject was made interestirig to the student of law through the
wealth of rare detail used in illustration;
to the general audience, through the thoroughly simple and untechnical manner
in which this institution was shown, by
most interesting illustrations, to be the
cornerstone of Anglo-Saxon liberty.
Through the kindness of Judge Reynolds we are enabled to print his lecture
in full.
The committee in charge deserves the
thanks and congratulations of all for the
large amount of work-which fell to their
lot, and for the successful outcome of their
efforts. The committee was as, follows:
William M. Mearkle, chairman; Robert
P. Stewart, Charles -H. Meyer, Edward T.
Daugherty, Howard M. Harpel.
The ushers were James N. Lightner.
William Henry Kern, Samuel E. Basehore, Artiur W. Mitchell, Robert J. Boryer and Robert K. MacConnell.
ALUMNI NOTES.
The following men visited Carlisle during the Commencement season: Gabriel
Moyer, '98; Garrett Stevens, .'99; Harry
C. Hubler, '99; William Jordan, '99; Cleon
Berntheisel, 198; Win. D. Boyer, '92.
At the Alumni dinner, Wednesday afternoon, Leon C. Prince, the elected representative of the graduating class, answered to the Law School toast. He
spoke in his usual brilliant and humorous
vein, and was heartily applauded.
DELTA CHI FRATERNITY.
Theyearly final banquet of the fraternity
took place on Friday, May 25, in Assembly
Hall.
Before the banquet, Major James E.
Pilcher, U. S. A., professor of Medical
Jurisprudence in the Law School, was initiated to honorary membership in the fraternity.
The year has closed with the prospects
of the fraternity brighter than ever.
THE LAW AND THE LAWYER'S
SPHERE.
Delivered at the Commencement of 1900 by
ROBERT HAYES SMITH.

The law is an unmeasurable subject. Its
extent and magnitude are only limited by
the boundary lines of human knowledge.
It touches and treats all men alike from

the least unto the greatest, and its protecting arms encircles each alike from the
greatest even unto the least. The law of any
nation makes its intelligence, its power,
in the world. It gives personal freedom
and makes sure the individual right to the
products of earnest toil. It is the guide
that directs our daily actions, that makes
men keep faitlhful to their lawful obligations, promises and words, thus regulating all the doings and transactions of
mankind, yea more than this, inquiring
into the motive and intent of every action,
thus making the inmost thoughts of man
subject to its imperial power.
"It is the characteristic end of Law
as an instrument of government," says
Amos, "to maintain the identity, the coherence, and the vitality of all the groups
of which the state is composed and to ascertain and regulate the relations of the several groups to one another and to the state
as a corporate whole." Our federal constitution is thus a law unto the states and
-the citizens, fixing, establishing and maintaining their relative obligations as firmly
as the unwritten laws which have been
forming through the centuries fix and
maintain the relative obligations of individuals. So too, to meet the demands of
a growing country, our legislative bodies,
both national and state, are continually
making new laws, and the judiciary are
daily handing down opinions, declaring
what the law is, and applying its principles to the multitudinous transactions of
life at the rate of more than one hundred
volumes a year. So extensive is becoming
the field of law that the decisions which
are being rendered by our courts in contested cases are filling so many thousand
volumes of reports and so many hundred
volumes of digests and text-books that no
man's life is long enough to read them.
From time to time, therefore, lawyers have
endeavored to set forth the various rules
of law as established by these decisions in
treatises and text-books, and out of this
mass of text-writers there have emerged
grea-tjurists whose scientific and masterly
treatment of their subjects has done much
to crystallize and perfect our law. This
class including such names as Justinian,
Littleton, Coke, Hale, Blackstone, together with those of our own time, such as
Kent, Story, Greenleaf, and, if I may be
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pardoned on this occasion, the name of our
eminent Dean.
Thus we see how during the centuries
thejudges by way ofjudicial decisions, and
the jurists by treatises and text-books have
been developing the law into a science.
The judges, while not only settling the
particular case in dispute, but establishing
with precision and on sound principles a
rule to be afterwards quoted and recognized
as governing similar cases. We accordingly come to know the cases by name and
speak of the rule in Coggs .ersus Bernard
or Hadley versus Baxendale as amechanic
speaks of his tools or a chemist of his formulas. A principle, having been set forth,
assumes the binding force of precedent.
The origin and development of law has
been most beautifully portrayed in the
fbllowing illustration. "At the seashore
you pick up a pebble, fashioned after the
law of nature in the exact form that best
resists pressure. It is worn as smooth as
glass. It is so perfect that you take it as a
keepsake. But could you know its history from the time it left the fragment of
rock and fell from the overhanging cliff
into the sea beneath to be taken possession
of by the under current and dragged from
one ocean to another, perhaps around the
world, for hundreds of years, until reduced
into its present form as you find it, you
would have a fit illustration of what many
'of the principles now in common use have
endured-thus tried, developed, fashioned
during the ages."
Certainly a system of law evolved from
the crudities of earlier times, fashioned
and developed by the progress of the pqople,
has about it a perfection which elicits the
admiration of every scholar.
Erskin, therefore, said of it "thewisdom
of law is greater than any man's wisdom,"
while other writers have gone further and
affirmed that the wisdom of law has become a science. "The law," says Blackstone, "is a science which is universal in
its extent, applicable to each individual,
yet comprehending all things," and Burke
has spoken of it as one of the best and
noblest of human sciences, ascience which
does more to cultivate and invigorate the
understanding than all other kinds of
learning put together.
While the law may be defined as a science

yet it is more than this. It is an ever developing science. While this may be true
of all ages, pre-eminently must it be so of
the present age. In this period of transition, when we as a nation are entering upon a wider career of usefulness, and as was
said by Justice Harland in one of his recent
public utterances, "a destiny awaits America such as has never been vouchsafed to
any people." The legal problems presented
must then necessarily be in proportion to
our greatness. Already as a result of our
foreign policy, our foreign commerce has
increased to such an extent that legal
reasoning and the application of legal
principles have produced subtleties and
nice distinctions not formerly known.
This remarkable period of transition is not
only true of our external but of our internal
affairs as well. For example the marvelous growth of large corporations and the
coilsolidation of capital in every form of
industrial enterprise.
So vast, therefore, has become the field
of law that specialization is necessarily the
trend of the age. We accordingly find the
leading lawyers of our country choosing
for themselves either the criminal or civil
law; some still the more select parts of the
general subject, as patents, corporations,
the admiralty, international and commercial law. It is then no light privilege for
us to begin life in such an age as this. It
is said that Thomas H. Benton greeted
Charles Summer on his entrance into the
Senate of the United States with the remark, "Young man you have come too
late; all the great questions are settled."
Certainly this saying cannot greet us as we
take our positions in life where our parts
are to be acted, though meagre they may
be, for never were there so many or such
vital questions demanding the attention of
earnest and devoted men. A wonderful
century is now opening before us; yet we
stand upon the threshold of the most brilliant epoch the world has yet seen.
In taking a retrospective glance of the
problems which have been decided in the
century now.nearing a close, we are
compelled to admit that many of the great
internal questions remain unsolved. True,
the slavery question has been settled; but
the abolition of slavery has given rise to
our race problems. The great civil war
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gave birth to our finaticial problems.
These, in connection -with our social and
dot*nestic problems, our momentous industrial problems, such as grow out of the inevitable conflict between labor and capital,
difficulties between employer and the employee, the questions growing out of the
inequality of taxation, the solution of the
evils resulting from the great combinations
of manufacturing interests commonly
known as trusts, and the problems as to
the government and disposition of our recent acquisitions of the islands of the seasthese are some of the mighty legal problems which now present and will continue
to present themselves for solution.
The wars of America have heretofore
settled affairs of state. Great questions of
policy, of national motives and national
conclusions, have been answered as soon as
the battle smoke cleared away and the
victor realized his victory. The war with
Spain has been unlike its predecessors.
Instead of solving problems, it has created
new ones which may not be solved lightly.
So each decade will bring us new difficulties
to surmount, new evils to subdue, new
problems to solve.
A cursory perusal of our history clearly
shows that heretofore all the great public
questions which have been determined
have been solved by lawyers. Thusin the
dark days following the revolution, such
lawyers as Hamilton, Jay and Madison
came to their country's aid and in spite of
what seemed an overwhelming opposition
gave us our national constitution. Later
we find the lawyers and judges settling
the questions of inter-state commerce, of a
national currency as defined in our
legal tender decisions, of reconstruction
amid the clamorings of rival state, or the
election of a president of this republic,
holding in their grasp the liberty of this
people, standing between peace -and war,
and preserving the rich inheritance of
freedom.
As in the past, so in the future not only
the strictly legal but all the great problems
confronting the American people will devolve upon the legal profession of this
country for their solution. That the highway of honor is open to the American lawyer, must be apparent to the most superficial observer, for the legislative hall, the

judicial bench and the executive chair are
directly in view from the lawyer's standpoint. However, a brief reference to statisties may show us more clearly the status
of the lawyer in America's affairs. Of the
fifty-six signers of the Declaration of Independence, twenty-five were lawyers. So
were thirty of the fifty-five members of the
Convention which framed the Federal
Constitution. Of the three thousand one
hundred twenty-two senators between 1787
and 1894, two thousand sixty-eight have
been lawyers; of the eleven thousand eight
hundred eighty-nine representatives, five
thousand eight hundred thirty-two have
been lawyers. So have nine-tenths of our
cabinet officers, three-fourths of our VicePresidents and twenty of our twenty-five
Presidents. That thejudiciary is composed
entirely of lawyers, it is scarcely necessary
to mention.
In view of these facts, that the law is an
ever developing science and that the sphere
of the lawyer is not alone the application
or the principles of this science to controverted questions between litigants in our
state or federal courts, but in guiding the
destinies of the state and nation, is it
not therefore of the utmost importance
that those who enter upon the legal profcssion should hav the highest and best
training possible. For this training the
law schools of our country are eminently
qualified. Time was when an eminent;
lawyer in full practice of his profession
was accustomed to take a class of students
into his office and become their teacher,
but that way is now impracticable in
most cases, and in any case its results are
not of the best kind. Hence the modern
Law School, an institution which has received the highest praise from foreign
writers who are free to attribute the superior attainments of the members of the
legal profession in the United States to the
excellence of its Law Schools.
Our own Law School aims to give the
student a thorough knowledge and appreciation of the fundamental principles of
the science of law, together with the power
to apply those principles almost instinctively to the many complicated combinations" of circumstances of every day life.
Also the power to discriminate between
right and wrong in the many delicate
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questions of dhty which axe continually
arising, and a character of such sterling
integrity and honor as will enable one unconsciously to resist what to weaker characters would be irresistible temptation,thus
aining to send into the legal profession
those who are in every way qualified for
the duties and responsibilities of their calling. Ever keeping abreast with the times,
where in its earlier history it had but the
two years course, now has a three years
course for graduation.
Lord Bolingbroke in one of his lectures
after describing the profession of law as in
its nature the noblest and most beneficial
to mankind, in its abuse the most sordid
and pernicious, rose to a high degree of eloquence and exclaimed, "There have been
lawyers that were orators, philosophers,
historians, there have been Bacons and
Clarendons, my Lord; there shall be none
such any more till in some better age men
learn to prefer fame to pelf and climb to
the vantage ground of general science."
May such ever be the aim of the Dickinson
School of Law, our Alma Mater, to point
the way to that high standard of excellence
so strongly put by Bolingbroke.
Now a few brief words of grateful acknowledgment and reluctant farewell.
All of us for two years and some of us for
three years past, coming from every section
of this great commonwealth and from distant sister states of our Federal Union have
dwelt in your midst and from time to time
have assembled in the Law School in studious pursuit of that knowledge and peculiar learning essential to the proper equipment of the American lawyer.
The study of law, generally speaking, is
dry, precise, painfully laborious and preeminently unpoetic. Yet by your many
kindnesses shown us during our incipient
legal career, the study of the law has been
a pleasure. In the coming years, if we
develop careers of usefulness and professional fame, rest assured we will gratefully
ascribe it in no small degree to our happy
social, moral and intellectual environment
as students here.
Gentlemen of the Law faculty, thought
must be the basis of intelligent and conservative action. This we have learned
not from the text-books we have studied
nor the volumes read. We speak sincerely

in assigning our best education to the
strong personality of the several members
of the faculty who thought not as others
thought, nor believed as others believed,
but who thought your own thoughts and
believed your own beliefs.
No body of men has such an influence
upon the thought of our land as the instructing force of a Law School. That
this power is exerted for the highest and
best welfare of man individually and sociallywe can aver from our own experience.
In behalf of the Law Class-Gentlemen
of the Faculty-I assure you of their sincere and grateful appreciation of your assiduous discharge of professional duty.
A word specialto you, most worthy Dean:
The position which you hold is in our
judgment the most honorable and responsible in the state. Future jurists, legislators, and sociologists of this and other commonwealths are being molded by you. You
have enjoyed many fruitfulyears at thebar.
Your legal works are to be found upon the
shelves of every progressive lawyer in the
state. Out of pureness of motive you are
giving your time and your eminent ability
exclusively that the legal profession
through you might be benefited. Such
members of our class as shall be fortunate
to attain careers at the bar can say of you
as Lord Campbell said of Mr. Tidd, his
instructor: "To the unspeakable advantage
of having been three years his pupil, I
ascribe chiefly my success at the bar."
May no ambition tempt you to stoop from
your lofty pedestal.
Butafew words to the GraduatingCiass:
Our Law School life for the most of us
is ended. We shall soon be in a new field
of action as individuals. We have been
here studying law as a theory but now go
forth to face it as a fact. May we then as
we go forth be brave, be strong, be earnest,
doing honest work for ourselves and for
humanity-ever remembering not only by
what name we are called and what an
honorable heritage is the name of The
Dickinson School of Law, but, as every
right and every privilege implies a duty,
that we owe her an unending debt of aid
and loyalty.
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THE BACCALAUREATE ADDRESS.
Delivered by Hon. Geo. G. Reynolds, LL. D.

thought he was wrong in a law suit?
Such persons argue, therefore, that the
whole system of jury trials in civil cases
3fr. Presidentand Gentlemen of the Law ought to be abolished, and the judges left
S'ehool, and Ladies and Gentlemen :-I to decide all questions of fact as well as of
law; as if the judges were well nigh infalhave thought that rather than occupy
your time this evening with any general lible, and as impartial as the traditional
and discursive talk about the theory and statue of justice, with her bandaged eyes
practice of law, it might be more inter- and balanced stales.
If I may be permitted to speak of my
esting to select a particular topic for disown
opinion, it might be better to say my
cussion.
Perhaps the most glittering prizes of the own feeling, I have my days when I am
in favor of trial by jury, and days when I
profession are those which are held out
more especially to the jury lawyer; and a find it very unsatisfactory.
Theoretically, I think the argument is
consideration of trial by jury will probably
decidedly in favor of the system in some
be as profitable as anything which I could
form, but, as often happens, our theories
present to you within the hour.
I shall not attempt any examination of do not always work out perfectly in practice. The conditions are not always at
the origin or history of "trial by jury."
It would not be profitable or interesting hand for getting the results which you can
for us to do, to inquire whether it was de- demonstrate ought to be sure to follow.
The jury system has its drawbacks and
veloped from Roman sources, or Scandinavian, or Norman or Saxon; or whether, its weaknesses, some of which I shall noas one writer says, "its origin is lost in the tice later on. I feel pretty sure of my
flight of time." It would be worse than ground, however, when I say that trial by
useless for us to plunge into any subh jury will never be abolished in this country while it is free, nor in any other Angloabyss as that.
Some of us have seen, hanging in office Saxon country that retains the spirit of
or library, a cartoon, called "the first trial liberty.
by jury," which, when brought out, obDe Tocqueville, one of the most philotained a prize. It represents a culprit
sophical and discriminating writers upon
brought before twelve Saxon jurors, sit- our institutions, whether foreign or nating in the presence of a judge (whatever
tive, in speaking of the jury as apolitical
may have been the name of his office), in
institution, says, "When the English
the open air, over the body of a murdered adopted trial by jury they were a semivictim. Mr. Forsyth, in his history, says barbarous people; they have become in
the picture well deserved its reputation as course of time one of the most enlightened
a work of art, but that, as a representation nations of the earth; and their attachment
of a historical fact, it is untrue.
to this institution seems to have increased
Our chief concern now iswith the insti- with their increasing cultivation. They
tution as we find it, as a part of the ad- soon spread beyond their insular boundaministration of justice now, and in com- ries to every corner of the habitable globe;
paratively recent times.
some have formed colonies, others indePerhaps the first and main question
pendent states; the mother country has
with the public is, whether, on the whole, maintained its monarchical constitution.
there-ought to be any such thing as trial Many of its offspring have founded powby jury, ufless it may be in criminal erful republics, but wherever the English
cases; whether the whole idea is not a have been they have boasted of the privimistake. I think it is quite a prevalent
lege of trial by jury. They have estabopinion that jury trials had better be dis- lished it, or hastened to re-establish it, in
pensed with. It is a very common thing all their settlements. A judicial instituto hear men say, "If I have a good case, I
tion which obtains the suffrages of a great
would rather try it before a judge alone; people for so long a series of ages, which
if I am wrong, I would rather take my is zealously renewed at every epoch of
chances before a jury." But who ever civilization in all the climates of the
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earth, and under every form of human
government, cannot be contrary to the
spirit of justice."
Whether you admit this conclusion or
not, you will at least see that the facts
prove the immense vitality of the institution and its tenacity of life, it would seem,
on account of its adaptability to free government, and to the blood of the two
leading nations of the race; a race (using
the term as embracingall the commingled
elements which now go to make up the
people of either of the two great Englishspeaking countries) which, wherever it
goes, whether or not it bears the sword in
one hand, in the other, at any rate, carries
the blessings of the best civilization in the
world.
An English writer tells us, "It has been
strongly said that the whole establishment of King, Lords and Commons, and
all the laws and statutes of the realm,
have only one great object, and that is to
bring twelve men into the box. This is
scarcely an exaggeration. For to what
end is the machinery of the Constitution
employed but to give to every man his
due, and protect all in the enjoyment of
their property, liberty and rights? And
the twelve men in the jury box are in this
country the great court of appeal, where
in the case of the humblest, as well as the
most exalted citizen these or any of these
are attached."
Among the Continental Nations of
Europe trial by jury has generally obtained only in criminal cases, and in England the power and province of the jury
in criminal cases have been the subject of
much greater public interest than any
questions of the use of such a tribunal in
civil actions. Whenever the Crown really
appointed the judges, whatever the form
of the appointment might be, and where,
as in former times more especially, the
Sovereign took a personal, and sometimes
a vindictive interest in State prosecutions, the interposition of the jury between
the government (and the judge who was
Its creature) on the one hand and the accused citizen on the other, has been regarded by the Englishman as the great
bulwark for the protection of his liberty
and life.
Erskine, whose fame as an English

orator is second perhaps only to that of
Pitt, whose merit as an orator was not
second to that of Pitt, though in a different sphere, won his greatest triumph in
asserting and vindicating in the courts
the power of the jury in the administration of the criminal law. The splendid
courage and eloquence by which he
wrested client after client from impending
death in prosecutions for treason and libel,
stamp him as the greatest advocate who
has ever appeared at the English bar.
His defense of Thomas Hardy, a poor
cobbler, who wasindicted for high treason,
was one of the greatest efforts of human
genius, and Hardy's acquittal one of the
greatest victories.
Erskine made a determined resistance
to any encroachments by the Courts upon
the province of the jury, sometimes going
beyond the law in that direction.
But before his time, the bulldozing of
juries by some of the judges was such as
not even a Jefftries would venture upon in
these days.
(This was illustrated by referencea to the
trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton in
1554, and of William Penn in 1670).
It is well to remember that as late as the
time of our revolution there were in England over two hundred different offences
punishable by death; and they didn't
seem to have much difficulty in convicting. Charles Wesley, in 1776, wrote to a
friend: "About two weeks ago I preached
a condemned sermon to about twenty
criminals and every one of them, I had
reason to believe, died penitent. Twenty
more must die next week." About the
evangelical repentance of these convicts
there is room for doubt, but that they were
sorry enough there is no question.
I do not desire, however, to consider
this subject with especial reference to the
use of juries in criminal cases.
Trial by jury in civil action is not only
fixed indestructibly in the system of
English law, but is imbedded in the frame
work of American jurisprudence by the
provisions of Federal and State Constitutions. Equity cases may be tried by the
judge alone, and indeed the questions in
such cases are generally so mixed and involve so much of judicial discretion that
they are mostly unfit for the decision bf a
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jury. But in what are known as Common
Law actions as a class, the right of trial by
jury is secured by these fundamental laws.
The important bearing of this will be
better appreciated if you stop a moment
to think how closely and potently the law
presses us and holds us in on every side,
and as well protects us on every side. We
go about our daily business and pleasures;
we rest in the security of our homes, under
the restraints and under the protection of
the law of the land. If our rights are invaded, if we invade the rights of another
and we do not agree with our adversary,
one or the other turns to the courts for
their judgment, and then both must go
there and submit to their determination of
the controversy. This is according to the
genius of the average American citizen.
In, all the marts of trade; in all the
enterprises of commerce; in all the
schemes which capital organizes, either
individually or in combination; in the
building of railroads in your city streets,
or from city to city, or from ocean to
ocean; in matters of personal liberty or
character; in the fiercest conflicts of interest or passion, there is everywhere and
always, the silent, if not spoken, assumption of the fact, that the courts hold*the
final, arbitrament when appealed to, and
that all the forces in society are pledged
to carry into effect their judgment.
Nearly a quarter of-a century ago, when
this whole country was quiveringwith excitement over a disputed claim to the
presidency, and the future seemed dark
and threatening, the great quarrel, National in its dimensions, and involving
the most violent political passions and
ambitions, was effectually settled by
throwing the whole issue into a law suit,
creating a special court to try it, and
pledging all parties to abide the decision.
The tribunal was appointed, the case was
argued by the lawyers and submitted,
and the decision made just in time for the
peaceable inauguration of the President.
Such being the liervasiveness and the
reach of law, as enforced by the courts,
one of the highest prerogatives and most
binding duties of the citizen is to participate in its administration in a sphere
subordinate to that of the judges, becoming thus a part of those tribunals which

determine all our rights and command
what shall be done between man and
man.
The jury system is~a means of educating
the citizen in all his,obligations to his fellowmen, and to the government which he
is bound to support; a most important
thing, especially under a popular form of
government like ours. It gives him not
only a knowledge of law in its various applications to the affairs of life, as he sees
it in practice, but a respect and attachment for that system of jurisprudence
which keeps civilized peace in the community ; because he not only sees its just
and equal operation, but he is one of its
factors; it is part of his handiwork; he
feels that he has participated, and he may
at any time again be called upon to participate in adjusting the rights of others and
in setting precedents which shall affect his
own rights. He feels that he is an important part of the government and has a
great stake in it and is bound to uphold
and defend it, and he has a right so to
feel.
As a bulwark against communism and
the turbulent spirit of anarchy, or any
kind of lawlessness, I would rely very
much upon a large, well educated jury
class of citizens. What must be the power
in the community of the courts which
interpret and administer the law, hot only
as armed with the processesof civil government for executing the decrees, but as educating the common mind to a proper
reverence for justice and order as the basis
of human society? The American citizen
is constitutionally fond of witnessing a
law suit, and when as spectator, juror or
party, he hears the sharp debates of the
lawyers, the charge of the judge and the
verdict of the jury, and then watches the
execution of the judgment, years after, it
may be, ipon the person or property of its
subject, he understands something of the
forces that reside in government.
Erskine once said at the bar, "More instructive lessons are taught in courts of
justice than the Church is able to inculcate. Morals come in the cold abstract
from the pulpit, but men smart under
them when we lawyers are thepreachers."
De Tocqueville, whom I have already
quoted, seems to think that while the

IEA
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jury system is the best mode of trial, so
far as concerns the education of the citizen,
it is doubtful whether it is the best as far
as relates to the case.
Let us see as to that. In about all cases
there are two classes of questions to be
settled, questions of fact and questions of
law; the first belong to the jury (injury
cases), the second to the court. I put
questions of fact first, because we must
determine the facts before we can apply
the law.
The plaintiff comes ilito court alleging
certain facts, on which he demands judgment. The defendant must admit or
deny, and he is pretty certain to deny the
determining facts; and he may set up new
matter. The requirement that pleadings
must be under oath seems to make very
little difference in making up the issues.
Although, as a general rule, both parties
know the facts, their allegations afford the
court very little satisfaction as to what
they know. Now, the jury are called in
to find what the truth is. Some newspaper has given a different definition of
their functions. "The jury," it says, "is
a number Of persons appointed by the
court to assist the lawyers in preventing
law from degenerating into justice."
Who can best get at the real facts, and
gather them out from the mass Of conflicting testimony, twelve men, or one? You
may say one man, trained to such investigations, and experienced in the analysis
of testimony, is surer to arrive at the correct result, than twelve whose faculties
have been developed on other lines. Let
us see. What are these questions that
have to be passed upon? They relate to
all kinds of business carried on in the
community. The merchants, the manufacturers, farmers, landlords and tenants,
employers and employed, insurers and
insured; all classes come with their disputes, involving questions which pertain
to these and all kinds of pursuits; questions of negligence or care in all our relations to our fellows. To solve these requires
experience in business callings ; the average judgment, sagacity and common
sense of men who have dealt with such
matters in practical life.
Of course, all this is under the direction
of the court, both as to what evidence
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shall be received, and as to the principles
of law to which the jury must conform
their verdict.
It is the conflict of testimony that occasions the great uncertainty in deciding
what are the facts in a given case. When
witnesses who, from general appearance,
are about equally credible, considering
what we know or can see of their character
and intelligence, directly contradict each
other in the most positive manner, the
common experience and judgment of
twelve men is, on the whole, safer than
that of one. This conflict does not always
arise from dishonesty in the witnesses. It
must be admitted that human testimony
in all its varieties is a very imperfect
means of arriving at the truth. Such are
the differences in the perceptive faculties
and reasoning power, such the force of
prejudices and pre-possessions, that upon
the plainest matters we seldom perfectly
agree. Perhaps none of us suspect how
much the images in our own minds are
distorted by the medium through which
they enter. Even as to objects of sense,
we find great difficulty in getting an
exact report. A number of eye-witnesses
to the same occurrence frequently get such
different, and often contradictory, impressions that no two will unite upon the
same details. And in matters of great
concern, you can set up almost any version or theory upon the authority of some
historian.
Especially is this diversity manifested
in the attempt to repeat conversations on
any kind of oral statement. A slight
change of expression, even the omission or
misplacing of a single word, will often
entirely pervert the meaning. Or the
imagination may supply a new word or
phrase, and some witnesses have an oriental imagination. And when we consider
how often the hearer fails to comprehend
the true import of words at the time they
are spoken, and how treacherous the
memory is at all times, the more so when
under the bias of interest or prejudice, we
perceive some of the difficulties in finding
out the truth.
But the greatest trouble of all arises out
of the perjury of witnesses. I would not
like to say that flat perjury is so very
common, but we find it often enough to
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be on our guard against it. It is shocking, yet not unprecedented, to see two
men go upon the stand and swear directly
against each other upon some definite and
unmistakable matter, so that we know one
side or the other is consciously lying.
There is no chance for the charitable supposition of a mistake, or that bias or selfinterest has deceived one or the other. It
compels one for the moment to agree with
that lying old reprobate, Fallstafl, "Lord,
Lord, how this world is given to lying."
Now, my observation convinces me that
not once in ten times does a perjurer successfully run the gauntlet of twelve pairs
of eyes looking at him from twelve different standpoints of previous discipline and
experience in the multifarious affairs of
life. There will generally be at-least three
or four men upon the jury who would detect that same liar if he should attempt to
impose a falsehood upon them in some
personal dealing or matter of business,
and they will be pretty apt to do it in
court, with all the advantage of the lights
and side-lights of the tial.
But witnesses generally go upon the
stand intending to tell the truth, and
sometimes we see that noble character,
made a proverb in the Bible, the man who
sweareth to his'own hurt and changeth
not.
There is one most important and comprehensive class of evidence which courts
are compelled to use most extensively, and
which intelligent jurors are specially qualified to deal with. Careful reflection wiil
show us that in the common affairs of life
we, to a very great extent, form our conclusions and take our action upon ipresumptive evidence. The man who is the
best discerner of signs and the best judge
of probabilities will, as a rule, arrive at the
most correct results. The facts we gather
from absolute and positive evidence are
few compared with the ultimate facts
which we reach by a course of reasoning,
but which we rely upon with confidence.
Indeed, it will be found, upon the last
analysis, that much of what we call direct
evidence is, after all, presumptive. The
following extreme illustration of this is
given by Chief Justice Appleton, and was
made use of by the Attorney General in
the noted case of Professor Webster. "You

see a man discharge a gun at another; you
see the flash; you hear the report; you
see a man fall dead, and you infer
from all these circumstances that there
was a ball discharged from the gun,
which entered his body and caused his
death, because this is the usual and natural cause of such an effect. But yqu did
not see the balleave the gun, pass through
the air and enter the body of the slain,
and your testimony to the fact of killing
is therefore only inferential; in other
words, circumstantial." But the judge
might have gone further, for even in so
plain a case of irresistible inference of fact,
we could not, without further proof, adjudge the man-slayer to be guilty of murder but for two presumptions, which the
law supplies: first, that every one is presumed to be sane till the contrary appears,
and second, that every sane man is presumed to intend the natural consequences
of his acts.
Now, the jury are summoned into court
to determine the differences between their
fellows, to a great extent, by reasoning
upon probabilities, which is just what
they have been doing all their lives in
their own pursuits; their faculties are
trained to alert and almost instinctive
procedure upon these very lines of reasoning. We all risk our interests upon conclusions drawn in this way. In our
practical deductions we act upon our
knowledge of the laws of nature, of animal
instincts, of the physical and intellectual
constitution of man. In regard tohuman
conduct we judge it generally to proceed
from the ordinary motives, affections and
passions which animate the human
breast. Thus, in a celebrated case, Solomon, acting both as judge and jury,
rightly decided a question between two
women claiming the same child, where
the positive evidence was in direct conflict, upon the simple presumption that a
mother's love would prompt her to give
up her offspring rather than see it slain.
That test solved the question at once, and
we are told that "the people saw that the
wisdom of God was in him to do judgment."
Of course we may be misled by trusting
too far to circumstantial evidence. It is
said circumstances cannot lie, but the
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witnesses who swear to them may lie, and this could hardly be said. But in these
there is danger that these circumstances cases the injustice is generally abparent
may .be fabricated through fraud and and in civil cases the court can and ought
malice. There have been cases where a to, and does usually, interfere and set aside
skillfully laid.plot has surrounded an in- the verdict, and submit the issues to a new
nocent person with appearances of guilt, trial. In criminal cases, if the jury
which seemed conclusive. Those of you wrongly acquit, there is no remedy. The
who have read the old fashioned orthodox judge, however, has the privilege of freeing
novels will remember a great many such his mind at the expense ot the jury and
cases, where the villian haswoven-his net- the criminal. It is related of one eminent
work of fraud till nothing but a benign Supreme Court judge, many years ago,
and wonderful Providence could deliver that while presiding at a trial for murder
the victim; and that Providence is pretty in Richmond county (now a part of New
sure to come in at the last moment, and York City), the jury acquitted the prisoner
in spite of the most overwhelming proof
just in the nick of time.
Bible history affords a simple illustra- of his guilt. Before the jury had left their
tion of manufactured circumstantial evi- seats the judge called upon the prisoner
dence. When Joseph secretly placed a to stand up and said, "You are entitled to
cup in Benjamin's sack and then sent be discharged, as the jury have most-unafter him to apprehend him for theft on accountably acquitted you; butremember,
thestrength of his being foundin possession you will have to answer for this crime
of apparently stolen property, he fabri- before a tribunal where there will be no
cated a case of circumstantial evidence chance for you to escape through the
against him. It was, however, an inno- stupidity or corruption of a Staten Island
cent device to bring back the brother he jury."
This reminds one, by contrast, of the
loved, and in this respect it was quite distinguishable from some of the tricks of his sentence whihh Lord Campbell says he
olce heard pronounced upon a prisoner
father in his unregenerate days.
Now, in this whole field of drawing con- who had been convicted of passing counclusions and rendering decisions upon terfeit bills. After pointing out to him
probabilities, either alone, or relied upon the enormity of his offense, and exhorting
to strike the balance when the direct testi- him to prepare for another world, (for it
mony is in conflict (which is the most was a hanging matter), the judge concluded, "And I trust that through the
common use of circumstantial evidence),
I would esteem it safer to rest upon the merits and mediation of our blessed Reunanimous verdict of twelve men, come deemer you may there experience that
to after a comparison, and it may be a mercy which a due regard to the credit
compromise of views from their various of the paper currency forbids you to hope
standpoints, than to the single opinion of for here."
The power of a skilled and adroit advoone man,though he might be wiser than
any one of them; and that on theprinciple cate is sometimes used in such a way as to
that "everybody knows more than any- warp a verdict from the straight line of
right. The popular reputation of a lawyer
body."
Besides, the judge is trained and prac- depends largely upon his influence with
ticed in a different kind of reasoning, juries. Fame in that direction sometimes
has a large money value. But the forum
dealing as he does with questions of law;
his processes are logical and scientific, for nowadays does not offer such a field for
mere eloquence and display as it once did.
we all know that law is one of the exact
The press of business, the rapid modes of
sciences.
I am not claiming that juries never its transaction, with stenographers and
make mistakes; far from it. They may limitations of time for summing up, these
even in some instances go wrong from and like causes have clipped the wings of
passion, or prejudice, or stupidity; in rare legal oratory. The advocate who can get
instances, I think, from corruption. There into the box as a thirteenth juror, who
are certain classes of cases, however, where appeals to their human nature and experi-

THE FORUM.
ence and common sense, and now and
then touches up some of the sentiments
and passions which may run his way;
such a lawyer, especially when he has the
closing address, will occasionally win a
verdict to which he has no right; and
sometimes like the man in the proverb,
"When he goeth his way he boasteth."
More especially in the country districts,
noted lawyers acquire large influence with
all classes through the personal acquaintance and reputation which is more easily
acquired there than in the large cities,
and thus at the country circuits they become a terror to their adversaries. But
even there this was much more th2 case
formerly than is possible at the present
day.
Possibly it was through jealousy of great
lawyers, and on account of their shielding
persons accused of crime, that in England
two centuries ago the counsel for a supposed libeller was regarded as an accomplice after the act, like a man who, for
instance, conceals one whom he knows to
be guilty of murder; and in Russia, it is
said they sometimes sent the lawyer with
his client to Siberia.
I have spoken of the educating influence of thejury system. Besidelthe moral
effects, jurors are able to pick up a good
deal of practical information. They find
out in the first place that law is founded
on principles of natural justice. Iam not
speaking of the laws that are made at Albany or Harrisburg; it is the Common Law
that is founded on common sense; the
statutes, on the contrary, are made by the
Legislature. The man who sits for one or
two weeks each year to assist the court in
administering law, taking the Instructions of the judge as to how it applies to
the case in hand, will get the knack of
applying it to his own conduct as a good
citizen; but more than that, his mind becomes broader by learning soniething of
matters outside of his own sphere. There
is hardly any business or profession, or
phase of life, but comes under investigation in the courts. The arts, sciences and
mechanics are investigated and explained.
In one case he 3hay be told, for instance,
all about a ship, from truck to keel; in
another he is shown the anatomy of the
human body; the next may be a suit be-

tween a broker and some sanguine and
confiding customer, .who has put up his
little margin and. soon found himself in
debt, and then our juror will learn several
things which it is cheaper to learn in
court than in Wall street. Then he may
be called on to try a malpractice case, and
he will learn how much his doctor and his
lawyer are bourdd to know before they
have a right to practice on him. The
clergy zire happily exempt from this class
of actions.
And then, almost every trial possesses
something of dramatic interest. Sometimes it is irresistibly comic; sometimes
pathetic, or even tragic. Here is a stage
upon which every human passion plays
its part. There are the surprises and ambuscades of a border warfare; nobody
knows what may turn up any moment,
and it is here that the unexpected often
happens. It is said th.t when a young
lawyer asked Daniel Webster for three
cardinal rules for the trial of a case, he replied: Be sure of your facts; be very sure
of your facts; be dead sure of your facts.
Now, if you could be sure of your own
facts it would be vain to think you can be
sure of the facts on the other side. But
no lawyer, however carefully he may prepare, can know even what his own witnesses will develop, especially upon the
cross-examination; least of all, can he anticipate with certainty what his adversary
may have In store.
We are told of one lawyer who was not
such a slave to facts as Webster was, for
it was said of him:
"When facts were weak,
His native cheek
Bore him serenely through."
Occasionally it happens that the battle
is short, sharp and decisive, going all one
way from the start. More often the fortunes of war waver, first inclining one
way, then the other. All'the timb the
wary counsel is watchiog the effect upon
the jurors of each new piece of evidence,
or of each turn in his argument. It not
infrequently happens that the tide -gets
set so strongly in one direction that elerybody feels it, no one more sensibly than
the lawyer, who sees in the faces of the
jury, as well as in the conclusive nature of
the evidence, that the verdict against him
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only waits the ordinary forms to be recorded. He immediately sets to work to
seize upon all manner of exceptions to the
rulings of the court, so that he may be
prepared for the appeal which is to follow.
The consequences of the verdict to the
pa;ties themselves are often of the most
serious character. I amnot now speaking
so much of criminal trials, where liberty
and life itself may hang upon the breath
of the jury; everybody knows what tragedies in real life are there enacted, and how
terrible or how joyous maybe the outcome
of the trial to the prisoner and his friends.
Most of what I have been saying to-night
has reference mainly to civil courts. A
man's fortune or character, or both, may
be staked on the issues which a few hours'
trial shall settle for him or against him.
I have seen meif go out of court apparently
dazed and hopeless under the crushing
blow of a verdict, which left them well
nigh bankrupt, either in money, or reputation, or domestic happiness, or in all.
Not least to be deplored is the exposure of
secrets which people of healthy minds are
most anxious to conceal, and which they
never reveal except in desperation or revenge.
To the lawyers who champion the parties in these exciting contests, the euse,
for the time being, becomes as real and as
dear as it is to the client, though doubtless, after a defeat, they sooner become
reconciled to it; it would be fatal to them
if they could not. They act upon what
their clients instruct them as to the facts
(in which they may be deceived), and as
a rule they believe in the justice of their
cause; they could not advocate it with any
spirit if they did not. Lord Chief Justice
Tenterden was a great judge, but he was
a miserably poor leader at the bar, almost
always losing the verdict. He hardly
ever tried a case before a jury if he could
help it. His biographer says: "This (his
want of success at the- bar) partly arose
from his power of discrimination and his
sound understanding, which, enabling
him to see the merits of the case on both
sides, afterwards so well fitted him to be
a judge." He adds: "I remember. a sergeant-at-law having brilliant success at
the bar from always sincerely believing
his client was entitled to success, although

when a Chief Justice he proved, without
exception and beyond all comparison, the
most indifferent judge who has appeared
in Westminster in my time."
I suppose the fact to be that in the
preparation of a case the lawyer ought to
see the strong and the weak points of each
side, but that on the trial the highest
power comes from seeing, whetheritreally
be so or not, that his own client is fully
right, not to be blinded, however, to the
difficulties and dangers of the case.
Little as Lord Tenterden enjoyed a career at the bar, and almost ignominiously
as he failed there, his whole soul went into
his duties as a judge. The scenes of the
court absorbedhis life, and coming home
one evening from an unfinished trial over
which he was presiding, a fatal fever
struck him, and in the delirium of that
night his last words were, "Gentlemen of
*he jury, consider of your verdict."
I will just cite one instance to show
what I have called the dramatic character
of jury trials, and it is one of the noted
cases in English history. It is known as
the trial of the Seven Bishops. It will
serve, too, to show you the part which a
jury acted in one great struggle between
tyranny on one side and human conscience
on the other.
About the year 1688, the fatuous and
obstinate James II., in that blundering
course which took him to his ruin, issued,
for a second time, what he called his
declaration of indulgence, by which he
undertook to dispense with certain statutes
of the realm relating to religious tests, as
if he had the power to nullify laws at his
royal pleasure. By an order in Council
he required of the clergy that they should
read this order in all churches and chapels
for two successive Sundays. This order
threw the country into a blaze of excitement. Many of the clergy would not
submit. One of those who refused to obey
took for his text, "Be it known unto thee,
O King, that we will not serve thy gods,
nor worship theagolden image which thou
hastset up." Another, with more humor,
said to his congregation, "My brethren, I
am obliged to read this declaration, but
you are not obliged to listen to it," and
waited till they had all gone out before
the reading began.
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The Seven Bishops sent a petition to the
King that they might be excused from
complying with the order, as it would
violate their consciences, inasmuch as it
was contrary to law. For this,.although
the petition was properly worded and perfectly respectful, they were arraigned as
for a seditious libel. First they were committed to the tower and then brought to
trial before Robert Wright, a perjured
swindler, whom the King had made chief
justice of the King's Bench, and who,
Lord Campbell says, was the lowest
wretch that had ever appeared on the
bench in England. This is saying a good
deal, for before that one chief justice had
been a highwayman befor he was judge
another judge was deservedly hung, as
several more ought to have been, and
worse than all that, Jeffries and Scroggs
had been chief justices, and Jeffries was
even then Lord Chancellor. As to Sir
John Popham, to whom I alluded as a
highwayman, while as a youth with his
roystering companions, he relieved gentlemen of their purses on the road after dark,
he afterwards became an able lawyer. I
can almost hear some one saying that by
that he merely transferred his activities
to another sphere.
As for Wright, who presided at the
trial we are speaking of, he was ignorant
of law, a drunkard, cruel and bloodthirsty.
The Puisne, or side judges, sat with
him, as they sometimes do, on very important criminal trials. Therewas a great
array of counsel and a crowded court room.
I will not stop to mention the various
fortunes of the case, or how first one side
and then the other seemed to be on the
way to victory. After the great debate
was over, the chief justice charged the
jury that the paper was aseditious libel.
Judge Powell told them the petition was no
libel, and that it was not seditious. Judge
Allibone. said it was both, and Judge
Halloway split the difference and left it
all to the jury. The chief justice added
nothing ftirther except to say, "Gentlemen of the jury, have you a mind to drink
before you go?" They had a glass of
wine each, after which they were marched
off in custody of the bailiff who was sworn
not to let them have meat or drink, fire or
candles, until they were agreed upon a

verdict. They staid out all night, owing
to the King's brewer.who was on the jury.
It was a hard situation for him, as the
poor fellow said, "If I say not guilty, I
shall brew no more for the King; if I say
guilty, I shall brew no more for any body
else." For a long time he inclined to the
King as his .best customer; but in the
morning a country gentleman stood up
and said, "Look at me, I am the largest
and strongest of the twelve, and before
I find such a petition as this a libel, here
I will stay till I am no bigger than a
tobacco pouch." This settled the case with
the brewer, and they agreed on a verdict
of acquittal.
Macauley says, "This wasa trial, which
even when coolly considered, perused
after the lapse of more than a century and
a half, has all the interest of a drama.
The advocates contended on both sides
with far more than professional keenness
and vehemence; the audience listened
with as much anxiety as if the fate of
every one of them was to be decided by
the verdict, and the turns of fortune were
so sudden and amazing that the multitude
repeatedly passed, in a single minute,
from anxiety to exultation, and back again
from exultation to still deeper anxiety."
One of the most thrilling passages in all
Macauley's writings, is his description of
the manner in which the verdict was received by the people of London and of the
whole country.
This is one lesson out of many which
show that juries to a certain extent take
their impulse fromthe popular heart. And
that way danger lies. In time of public
excitement, popular prejudice and popular
clamor may interfere with the due administration of law, unless juries are composed of the best and most substantial and
intelligent citizens.
Suffer a few words in conclusion, by
way of showing the relation of this subject
to the hopes and ambitions of such as are
just entering upon our most useful and
honorable profession.
I can speak from an obseryation of more
than fifty years as a member of the bar.
The most brilliant reputations are, as a
rulQ, won by those who devote themselves
mainly to that kind of litigation which
has to do with the jury trial. Idonotsay
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the most solid or enduring. The fame of
a lawyer is, at best, most generally of an
evanescent character. The lawyer himself may be a monument of brass, but in
such case his memory will soon perish.
The remembrance of most members of
our profession, even the most eminent of
them, fades away quickly. They seldom
write themselvesinto history or literature;
that is, they do not as lawyers. Those
who deal mainly with questions of law
before the courts, and the judges who fill
volumes with their instructive and perplexing statements of the law, make a
record which goes upon the shelves of the
Law Library, to most men, and even to
many lawyers, the dryest of all dry places,
and though the briefs of the counsel and
the opinions of the judges may contain
thb profoundest of logic and the purest of
English,-they are not classedas literature.
In his day and generation, the advocate
may attain some degree of popular applause, but it generally dies soon after
him.
There are indeed vague traditions in the
profession of the marvelous eloquence of
some of the giants of the Bar in former
days, but the impassioned oratory which
grows out of individual concerns, and personal controvernies, has not that carrying
quality which gives it universal or permanent interest. Indeed, there is reason to
suspect that these traditions, in most
cases, exaggerate the real facts. The
specimens that have been transmitted to
us, in many cases, show an ornate and
rhetorical style which would scarcely be
tolerable in court under the quite different
conditions of the present day.
As I hinted before, the machinery of
our courts is adjusted to a much more expeditious disposal of business. The calendars are crowded, the waiting cases are
pressing, the court-room is filled with
parties, witnesses and lawyers impatient
to have you out of the way, to say nothing
of the judge who is perhaps the most impatient of all. The jurors are, or ought to
be, men of affairs, with keen business
instincts and ready, hard, common sense,
anxious to dispatch the case in hand and
not easily moved, where the appeal to
their emotions is open and undisguised, so
that what we hear described by an over-

worked phrase, as word painting, has very
little place in court. It is true, there may
properly be appeals to sentiment, and
sometimes to passion, of the righteous
kind. Moral indignation may be excited
in the breast of the juror when the fit
occasion calls for it, and sometimes there
is opportunity, whether its use be justifiable or not, to take advantage -of his
sympathies or his prejudices. It is obvious,
therefore, that the successful jury lawyer
must be adroit, watchful, self-poised, that
he must be versed in the knoowledge of
every day affairs, especially that he shall
have a practical, workable knowledge of
human nature. And, let me add, that,
as the foundation of any enduring success,
he must have moral sense enough to know
well the distinctions between right and
wrong, and conscience enough to live up to
them. I hold that every lawyer ought to
be honest, not only with the court, where
dishonesty is apt to be detected, but with
the jury, where insincerity and misrepresentation may for the occasion escape discovery. No man can afford to lose the
respect of his own sober judgment.
The great danger is, that through professional pride, or overzeal, or the hope of
large gains, we should lose sight, temporarily, of the eternal principles of right
and truth, and assist in working some
injustice between man and man. When
the heat of the battle is over, if you have
to reflect that you have been the means,
by any conscious perversion of facts or
law, of robbing any man of his rights, you
have made a sacrifice which no client has
a right to demand. No man, however
entitled to consideration, no price which
any man may bring in his hand, should
ever induce you to debauch your own
conscience. How apt to this is the advice
of Polonius to Laertes, in the play of
Hamlet"This above all-to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man."I
We may get on the wrong side without
knowing it. We are apt to find it out in
the end, or at any rate to find what the
court thinks about it, or the jury; but let
us at all events keep a conscience void of
offense.
One of George MacDonald's heroes, on
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the eve of a great fight, thus describes the
burden of hih prayer for victory: "'1Moreover, I am no saint, and therefore cannot
pray like a saint, but only like Richard
Heywood, who hath got -to, do 'his'duty,
and issomewhatpuzzled. Therefore pray
I thus, or to this effect: '0 God of battles!
who, Thyself dwelling in peace, beholdest
the strife, and workest Thy will thereby,
what that good and perfect will of Thine
is, I know not clearly, but Thou has sent
us to be doing, and Taou hatest cowardice. Thou knowest I have sought to
choose the best, so far as goeth my poor
ken, and to this battle I am pledged.
Give me graceto fight like a soldier of
Thine, without wrath and without fear.
Give me to do my duty, but give the
victory where Thou pleasest. Let me
live, if so Thou wilt; let me die, if so Thou
wilt-only let me die in honor with Thee.
Let the truth be victorious, if not now,
yet when it shall please Thee, and oh! I
pray, let no deed of mine delqy its coming. Let my work fail if it be unto evil,
but save my poulin truth.' Andin truth,
Sir Rowland, it seemeth to me then as if
the God of truth heard me."
Such a prayer, if sincere, is sure to meet
its answer. If we live and battle in such
a spirit, in the thing We do, and in the
manner of our doing it, we shall be without fear and without reproach.

MOOT COURT.
R. R. CO. vs. JOHN HENRY.
Common carrie=s-Negligence--Public
policy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Henry having need almost daily to send
agents from Philadelphia to Pittsburg on
business, made a contract with the R. R.
Company td transport these agents at onehalf the ordinary rates, but the Company
exacted from Henry an agreement to indemnify it from any loss from having to
compensate any agent for injury to himself
or property While on the cars of the plaintiff, -whether such injury, arose fron the
negligence of the plaintiffs servants or
otherwise. Win. Semple was one such
agent, and while riding on plaintiifs cars

on July 8, 1898, was caused by the negligence of the servants of'the plaintiff to be
thrown from the car while in the act of
allghfing and suffered damages for which
he sued the Company and obtained a judgment for $2500. Henry, although cited to
defend the suit, paid no attention to it.
At the trial, Semple and the attorney of
the R. R. Co. without submitting any evidence agreed on the verdict of $2500. The
assumpsit by theR. R. Co. to recover the
i ndqmnity from Henry.
KATZ and LAVENS for the plaintiff.
1. A contract of this nature is not contrary to public policy, and is therefore
valid.-Horse Car Co. v. Fidelity Ins. Co.,
160 Pa. 354; Employers' Ins. Co. v. Merrill,
155 Mass. 404; Railroad Co. v. Ins. Co., 4
Forum 86.
BoLTE and KERN for the defendant.
1. A contract by a common carrier exempting it from liability for its negligence
is contrary to public policy and void. Pa.
R. R. Co. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. 315; Ins.
Co.'v. Oil Co., 63 Pa. 14; Goldey v. Pa. R.
R. Co., 30 Pa. 242; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Butler,
57 Pa. 335; Pa. R. R. Co. v. McCloskey, 23
Pa. 532.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The plaintiffs in th*is action profess to
found their claim upon an agreement of
the defendant which they had exacted
from him, to indemnify them from having
to compensate any agent of the defendant
for injury to-himself or property while on
the cars of the plaintiffs,whether said injury arose from the negligence of the plaintiffs' servants or otherwise. This agreement was entered into in consideration' of
the reduced rates at which the agent of
Henry was to be carried from Philadelphia
to Pittsburg. Whether the plaintiffs can
maintain this action depends upon their
right to make a special agreement which
will exempt them from all responsibility.
At common law, a carrier who received
goods as such was responsible for every injury occasioned to them by any means except the act of God or of public enemies.

Peek v. lTorth, 10 H. L. C. 493.

In Penn-

sylvania the common law responsibility
'may be limited or abridged by the special
terms of the acceptance of the goods.Camden and Amboy.R. R. Co. v. Baldauf,
16 Pa. 67; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Henderson,
51 Pa. 315; Penna. R.-R. Co. v. Raiordon,
119 Pa. 577..
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Where accidents occur which no human
skill could guard against, it is only just
and reasonable that a common carrier
should not be held responsible for any loss;
where valuable articles which are liable to
be stolen are carried, it is right that they
should be permitted to stipulate against
danger. The law can give effect to such
stipulations without violating any important principle.-Railroad v. Lockwood, 84
U. S. 365.
But in PeLnsylvania it is settled by a
long course of decisions that a common
carrier cannot, by notice orspecial contract,
limit his liability so as to exonerate him
from responsibility for his own negligence
or misfeasance, or that of his selvants or
agents.-Beckman v. Shouse, 5 Rawle,
179; Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. 479; Camden &
Amboy R. R. Co. v. Baldauf, 16 Pa. 67;
Goldey v. The Penna. R. R. Co., 30 Pa.
242; Powell v. The Penna. R. R. Co., 32
Pa. 414; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Henderson,
51 Pa. 315; Farnham v. Camden and Amboy R. R. Co., 55 Pa. 53; American Express
Co. v. Sands, 55 Pa. 140; Empire Transportat ion Co. v. Wamsutta Oil Co., 63 Pa. 14;
Penna. R. R. Co. v. Raiordon, 119 Pa. 577;
Johnson v. Railroad, 163 Pa. 133.
Any obligations and stipulations for exemptions which would amount to an abdication of the essential duties of his employment would be improper and unreasonable.
Any attempt of carriers to stipulate by
special contract against their responsibility
for losses resulting from their negligence
will not be upheld by the law, as such
agreements are against public policy and
are void. Mitchell v. Smith, 1 Binn. 120;
Lloyd v. Leisenring, 7 Watts 294; Weekerly v. Lutheran Cong., 3 Rawle 172; Columbia Bank andBridge Co. v. Haldeman,
7 W. & S. 233; Camden and Amboy R. R.
Co. v. Baldauf, 16 Pa. 67; Penna. R. R. Co.
v. Raiordon, 119 Pa. 577; Forepaugh v.
Railroad Co., 128 Pa. 217; Crew v. Bradstreet Co., 134 Pa. 161.
William Semple obtained a judgment
against the Railroad Company expresslk
on the ground that his injuries were due
to the negligence of their servants. The
plaintiffs cannot open their case without
showing that they have broken the law,
and the court will not assist them, whatever their claims in justice may be upon

the defendant.

Swan v. Scott, 11 S. & R.

163; Thomas v. Brady, 10 Pa. 170; Scott v.
Duffy, 14 Pa. 20; Evans v. Dravo, 24 Pa.
65; Fowler v. Scully, 72 Pa. 468.
The defeddant is under no legal obligation to indemnify the plaintiffs since the
agreement limiting their liability is void.
Weckerly v. Lutheran Cong. supra; Columbia Bank and Bridge Co. v. Haldeman, supra.
Since the contract to exempt the Railroad Company from all responsibility is
void as against public policy, the defendant, Henry, was under no legal duty to
defend the suit which had been brought
against the plaintiffs by Semple. Columbia Bank and Bridge Co. v. Haldeman,
supra.
Judgment for defendant.
SAMUEL E. BASEHOBE,

P. J.

Thi5 is an agreement between the R. R.
Co. and John Henry to indemnify the
former for any loss from having to compensate any agent for injury to himself or
property while on the cars of the plaintiffs,
whether such injury arose from the negligence of the plaintiffs' servants or otherwise. Wm. Semple, it appears,, was such
an agent and was injured while riding on
plaintifts' cars on July 3, 1898, caused by
the negligence of the plaintiffs' servants.
It is contended that the contract between
t he R. R. Company and Henry is founded
on a good condition and therefore valid,
not being contrary to public policy, and to
uphold this the plaintiffs' attorneys have
cited: Horse Car Co. v. Fidelity Casualty
Ins. Co., 160 Pa. 354; Employers' Liability
Ins. Co. v. George S. Merrill, 155 Mass.
404.
We may say that the agreement in the
case at bar is vastly different from the
cases cited by the plaintiffs' attorneys.
Insurance companies are incorporated
under the laws of the state for different
purposes than are railroad companies. It
is the business of the former to indemnify
parties against accident. We cannot therefore construe the cases above to apply to
the case at bar.
The liability in 160 Pa. 334 (supra)arose
from an accident caused by the negligence
of the servants of the R. R. Co. by being
thrown from a car.
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The construction and validity of a contract is to be governed by the law of the
place where it was made and is to b performed. Addison on Cont., 195; Story,
Confl. of Laws, 242; Scadder v. Bank, 91
U. S. 406.
This principle hasbeen distinctly applied
to contract of common carriers. Brook v.
Railroad Co., 108 Pa. 529.
Contracts stipulating for exemption from
negligence are not favored by law, and, in
some instances, a in the case of common
carriers, they are prohibited entirely, as
being against public policy. In all cases
in which they are permitted and effect
given to them, such contracts should be
construed strictly, with every intendment
against the party seeking their protection.
J. L. Crew et al v. The Bradstreet Co. 134
Pa. 161.
It is against public policy to allow any
person, natural or artificial, to contract
againstliability for negligence. Farnham
v. Railroad Co., 55 Pa. 53; American Exp.
Co. v. Sands, 55 Pa. 140; Georgan v. Express Co., 114 Pa. 523. In Chap. v of Common Carrier, Art. 1 1141, p. 340, with a
marginal reading, "A common carrier
cannot be exonerated, by an agreement
made in anticipation thereof, from liability
for the gross negligence, fraud or willful
wrong of himself or his servants."
Upon looking over the decisions of our
own state, we find the common law doctrine followed. In Pennsylvania we have
always adhered to one rule withregard to
the limitation of their liability as common
carriers, from BeekhamV. Shouse, 5 Rawle
179, decided on March 30, 1835, to Goldy v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 6 C. 248, decided in 1858, a period of twenty-three
years, and such is still the doctrine of our
state.
This same doctrine is recognized in 51
Pa. 315, The Pennsylvania Railroad Co.-v.
Holden.
It is unnecessary to go out of our own
state for authorities on this point. The
doctrine is recognized so late as 163 Pa. 127.
In this case there is a provision as to past
negligence, in the former there is no public
policy transgressed, but on the other hand
the doctrine of public policy is recognized.
The contract being against public policy,
illegal, and therefore void, the defendant

was not obliged to defend in the original
suit, even though cited so to do. Columbia Bank and Bridge Co. v. Haldeman.
Judgment for defendant.
AMOS GLENNON vs. ARTHUR
ROPER.
Liabilityof Hteel Keepers-Parent'sright
of action--ireescapes.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Roper was keeper of a hotel, five stories
high, without fire escapes. John Glennon,
a lad of nineteen, was a guest at the house
on the night of June 17th, 1898. He occupied a room on the fourth floor. A fire
occurred through the negligence of a servant, and Glennon was aroused from sleep
at 1 A. m., when he dressed himself, opened
the door of his room and attempted to rush
down stairs. He reached the second story
when he was suffocated by smoke, fell and
was soon killed. Had there been a fire
escape on the outside of the building, with
proper connection with the window of his
room he could have safely escaped from
the building.
His father brings this suit.
GERY and DEEBLE for the plaintiff.

1. Act May 9, 1889, provides for a fire
escape to hotels over two stories in height.
2. Persons entitled to recover for injury
causing death shall be husband, widow,
children or parents of the deceased. Act
of June 3, 1885. P.R. R. Co. v. 'Adams,
55 Pa. 499; P. R. R. Co. v. Keller, 67 Pa.
300; North Penn. R. R. v. Kirk, 90 Pa. 15;
Lehigh Iron Co. v. Rupp, 100 Pa. 95.
HARPEL and PoINTs for the defendant.
1. The action should have- been brought
jointly by both the father and mother instead of the father alone. Penn. R. R. Co.
v. Zeer, 33 Pa. 318; Penn. R. R. Co. v.
Adams, 55 Pa. 499; Penn. R. R. Co. v.
Keller, 67 Pa. 300; North Penn. R. R. Co.
v. Kirk, 90 Pa. 15; Weaver v., Iselin, 161
Pa. 390.
2. An action of this nature is barred unless brought within one year after, the
deatb. Itis now one year and nine months
since the cause of action accrued. Act of
April 26, 1855,2 P. &. L. 3236.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

At commonlaw it is evident, the present
action would not lie. The act of June 11,
1879, established a duty to erect fire escapes
and a right in those who suffered in con-
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sequence of the neglect of this duty, to
support an action. This duty and right
were, with modifications, continued by
the act of June 3rd 1885, May 9th, 1889,
and June 8, 1893; 1 P. &. L. 2109 et seg.
The first section of the act of 1885 requires
every "hotel for the accommodation (f the
public," to be provided with a permanent,
safe, external means of escape. The
building in which Glennon met the fatal
accident, was such a hotel. It was not
provided with a fire escape. Somebody,
then, has neglected to perform a duty. On
whom did the duty rest?
The act of 1879 had made it"the duty of
the owner or keepers of such hotels" to
provide the fire escapes. This act was
amended by that of 1885, so as to impose
the duty on "the owner or owners in fee
or for life of every such building." Under
the former act, it was held that the owner
or keeper was one who was in possession
and control, whether under a fee simple,
or tenancy for years. Schott v. Harvey,
105 Pa.922; Kelley v. O'Conner, 106 Pa. 32,
and not the ownef in fee who was not in
such possession and control. The object
of the latter act was, manifestly, to substitute for the tenant, the owner in fee or for
life, without regard to his possession. In
re Fire Escapes, 2 D. R. 298.
The court below thinking that the evidence did not justify the inference that the
defendant was owner in fee or for life of
the hotel, refused to allow the jury to find
a verdict for the plaintiff. It appears by
the testimony that Roper was the' 'keeper"
of the hotel. It is to be regretted that it
does not more explicitly appear what the
nature of his interest in the hotel was.
Roper might be "keeper," as a tenant for
years, or for life, or in fee. But from the
fact of his possession and control, expressed
by the word "keeper," the natural presumption is that he was owner in fee, in
the absence of evidence by him that his
estate was less. Jones v. Bland, 112 Pa.
176. If the defendant wished to avoid this
presumption, he should have shown what
his title was.
Another ground for the action of the
court below was that the period of one
year had been allowed to elapse since the
accident, before this suit was brought.
The 3rd section of the act of June 3rd, 1885,
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1 P. & L. 2113, makes the owner liable to
an action in case of death or personal injuries, to "any person now authorized by
law tosue." The 1st section of the act of
April 26th,.1855, 2 P. &. L. 3234, defines
the persons who may maintain the action;
and the 2nd section prescribes that "the
action shall be bkought within one year
after the death, and not thereafter." As
the record does not show that one year
had elapsed since the death of John Glennon, it is difficult to see how the one year
limitation bars the action. A point was
made in the court below, that the action
should have been brought in the name of
both the parents of John Glennon. But
it does not appear that his mother was
alive. It will not be presumed that she is,
simply to defeat an action brought by the
father alone. The defendant must show
her survival, if he wishes to take advantage
or it.
Judgment reversed.
JONES vs. BARTRON.
Deed- Uncertainty.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The controversy arises over the construction of the following deed:
"This indenture
James Bartron
made theday of-to
Heirs of James Bartron
A. D. 1864, bet tween
James Bartron and Mary, his wife, ofand the heirs of James Bartron and wife.
Witnesseth ; that the said party of the
first part, for and in consideration of one
dollar, to me in hand paid by the said
party -of the second part, and receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, has granted, bargained and sold, released and confirmed, and by these presents do grant,
bargain and sell, release and confirm to
the said party of the second part and their
heirs, all that certain piece or parcel of
land (situate and described, etc.)
Together with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto
belonging, and the reversions, remainders,
rents, issues and profits thereof. Also all
the estate, right, title, interest, property,
claim or demand whatsoever of the said
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on a judgment obtained against James
Bartron, to recover the possession of premises, the title to which is claimed by Henry
Bartron and Samuel Bartron, children of
James Bartron and wife.
It is the duty of the plaintiff, in an action ofejectment, to establish, not the inferiority of the defendant's title, but the
superiority of his own; it is the sine qua
non of his case; without it he can do nothing. It follows, therefore, that if the title
to the property at the time of the sheriff's
sale was in the defendant in the execution,
that title passed to the plaintiff as purchaser, and unless the title claimed by the
defendants is the better of the two, this
action can be maintained. The deed on
which defendants base their ownership
was made in 1894 by James and Mary
MARY BARTRON [L. S.]
Bartron to "the heirs of James Bartron
Signed, sealed and delivered in the presand wife." It is a fundamental rule in
ence of us.
the law of conveyancing that there must
JOHN JONES.
be named in the deed a definitely ascerTHOMAS BROWN.
tained grantee, whom the law can recogWhen this deed was made Bartron and
nize as the owner of the property. Failing
wife had no children. They have since
in this, the deed is void for want of cerhad children, who are now living. Five
tainty, and passes no title. But the law
years after the deed was made, and
is satisfied if, lacking a specific designaafter two of the children, yet living, were
tion, the deed nevertheless sets forth any
born, the land was sold on execution on a
additional facts or circumstances from
judgment against Bartron. This is ejectwhich it can infer with certainty the
ment by the purchaser, William Jones, v.
names of the intended grantees: id cerHenry and Samuel Bartron, the children.
ium est quod certum reddipotest. ApplyHEIST and HOLCOMB for the plaintiff.
ing these rules of construction to the deed
1. The deed purports to convey inprae- under which defendants claim their title,
scnti to the heirs of a person in being, and
is therefore void on account of uncer- it is evident thatitisinoperative. It purtainty. Hall v. Leonard, 1 Pick. 27; Mor- ports to convey the tract of land in quesris v. Stephens, 46 Pa. 201; Huss v. Stetion to "the heirs of James Bartron and
phens, 51 Pa. 282.
wife;" but who were "the heirs of James
COLLINS and DEAL for the defendant.
Bartron and wife?" Manifestly no one,
1. The defendants, children, of James
for nemo est hoeres viventis. Nor are
Bartron, are in lawful possession, for it
there any facts set forth in the deed, or
will appear from the deed that "heirs"
any extraneous facts or circumstances,
was used in sense of "children."
Vide
the words, "the heirs of James Bartron
which would warrant any other interpreand wife." Cf. Huss v. Stephens, 51 Pa.
tation of the instrument. In Morris v.
282.
Stephens, 46 Pa. 200, the court held a con2. The plaintiffs cannot recover, for if
veyance to the heirs of a living person
the first construction of the deed be refused, then the grant must be taken to be
void for want of certainty, notwithstandto James Bartron's wife, and plaintiffs'
ing the argument of defendant that the
title is void. Green v. Cooper, 4 Forum
word "heirs" should be read as "chil103; Huss v. Stephens, 51 Pa. 282.
dren," the person named as grantee havOPINION OF TH[E COURT.
i ng children living at the time. While itis
This action of ejectment is brought by
true that the word "heirs" in a will can
William Jones, purchaser of the premises
be construed as a word of purchase, if such
at a sheriff's sale on an execution issued
was the evident intention of the testator,
party of the first part of, in, or to the above
described premises, with the appurtenances thereunto belonging. To have and
to hold the said premises as above described with the appurtenances unto the
said party of the second part and to their
heirs forever, and the said James Bartron,
his heirs, executors and administrators,
do covenant, grant, bargain and agree to
and with the said party of the second
part, their heirs and assigns, against all
and every person or persons lawfully
claiming or to claim the same or any part
thereof will forever warrant and defend.
In witness whereof, the said party of the
first part have hereunto set their hands
and seals the day and year first above
written.
JAMES BARTRON [L. S.]
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yet a stricter rule is applied in construing
deeds, and the word "heirs," unless it is
plainly evident from a perusal of the instrument that itreferred to a certain designated person or class of persons, will be
treated in its technical sense, i. e., held to
be a'word of limitation. Simultaneous
with the execution of the deed referred to
in Morris v. Stephens, supra, the same
grantor executed another conveyance to the
heirs of his son,the consideration expressed
being the sum of one dollar in money and
"the natural love and affection he hath for
his grandchildren." Laying hold of the
circumstance that he had indicated by the
word " grandchildren" that they were to
be the heirs, the court said there was a
sufficient designatiopersonarum to overcome the uncertainty which invalidated
the other deed, and gave effect to the
grantor's intention to pass the estate to
his grandchildren. Huss v. Stephens, 51
Pa. 282.
Unfortunately for the defendants in the
case at bar, we can find nothing in the
deed, or in the surrounding facts or circumstances, which would justify us in
saying that the pretended conveyance to
"the heirs of James Bartron and wife"
was sufficient to pass the title to them as
the children of James Bartron and wife,
for throughout the whole instrument the
grantees are referred to only as "their
heirs," and when it was executed they had
nto children. Since the grantors have
failed to indicate, either by express words
or by the recital of any other facts or circumstances, in the deed the persons whom
they intended as their grantees, our duty
is but to apply the law as it exists and
pronounce the deed void for uncertainty.
Counsel for defendant has argued with
much earnestness that this case is ruled
by that of Green v. Cooper, IV. Forum
103. There a conveyance was made to
"Pamelia Talbot and Stephen A. Talbot's
heirs, * * party of the second part, her
and Stephen A. Talbot's heirs," and the
court held that Pamelia Talbot took a fee,
while, there being nothing to "individuate" the heirs of Stephen A. Talbot,
the grant gave them nothing. It is plain,then, that instead of being authority for
the proposition that the conveyance to
"the heirs of James Bartron and wife"

vested the property in their children, it
militates directly against it, and supports
our conclusion that underthe deed defendants took no title. The ownership of the
premises, therefore, remained in James
fBartron ; plaintiff being the purchaser of
his interest under the execution, judgment
will be entered in his favor.
Gxo. W. AUBREY, J.

The deed of conveyance under which
the defendants claim title to the land described therein is attacked by the plaintiff
in this action of ejectment, because the
grantees are not sufficiently designated.
The said indenture purports to convey the
described tract of land to the "heirs of
James Bartron and wife." At the date of
conveyance James Bartron and wife did
not have any children.
It is essential to the validity of a conveyance that there be a grantor and a
grantee, and these must be described with
reasonable certainty. Were there any
persons, capable of taking, answering the
description, "heirs of James Bartron and
wife?" Nemo est hoeres viventis. There
must be somebody in esse to whom the
descriptive words designating the grantees
will apply, and enough must appear to
ascertain the grantees, and to distinguish
them from all others.
In Morris v. Stephens, 46 Pa. 200, there
was a conveyance by Andrew Lontz, Sr.,
to the heirs of his son, Andrew, who was
then living. The court below declared the
deed void for uncertainty. The opinion of
the lower court was affirmed, Lowrie, C.
J., writing the opinion. Nor is the validity of the opinion just referred to questioned in either Huss v. Stephens, 51 Pa.
282, or in Stephens v. Huss, 54 Pa. 20.
The first case cited is distinguished from
the last two in that the only words used
to individuate the grantees was in the
former, "the heirs of his son, Andrew,"
while in the latter the words, "heirs of his
son, Andrew," were followed by the
words, "in consideration of one dollar, and
the natural love and affection for his
grandchildren." Woodward, C. J., conmenting upon the force of the words just
cited, said: "It is an instance where the
context of the instrument proves that the
word heirs is to be taken in its popular
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and not in its technical sense. Acknowledging the consideration to be love and
affection for his grandchildren, he intended by that sure token that they should
take an estate from him."
Nor is the correctness of the law as
stated by Lowrie, C. J., in Morris v. Stephens, 46 Pa. 200, questioned, 'or said
opinion affected in any way by Huss v.
Morris, 63 Pa. 367. In the latter case,
which involved the rights of the same
parties and the validity of the same titd
as in the case reported in 46 Pa. 200, the
plaintiff alleged a mistake in the execution
of the deed, and offered evidence to prove
the mistake. The opinion of the lower
court was reversed, because the evidence
was withdrawn from the jury.
In the case at bar the grantees were not
in esse at the time of the attempted conveyance, or if in being, they were not
sufficiently designated, hence the deed
was void for uncertainty, and amounted
to only an abortive attempt to convey.
"A deed to the heirs of a living person is
void for uncertainty, for the deed purports
to convey in praesenti, and the grantees
cannot be ascertained until the death of
the person named." 2 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
of Law, 9 vol. 182.
The contention that the instrument
of conveyance was a will is entirely
untenable.
The title to the property described in
the deed was in James Bartron at the
time of the sheriff's sale; the purchaser
acquired a good title. Judgment entered
for plaintiff.
J. G. MILLER, J.

lord agreed with Crowell immediately to
rebuild, and the rebuilding occupied 6
months. For the rent of which period,
Crowell paid the landlord $150.
The
landlord subsequently obtaining from an
insurance company, in which his own
interest was insured, money enough to
rebuild, as a gratuity repaid to Crowell
$75. Defendant refused to pay anything.
Assumpsit.
MILLER and PIPER for the plaintiff.

1. Entry of a landlord to repair, with
tenant's assent, does not act as eviction or
rescission of lease. Heller v. Royal Ins.
Co., 177 Pa. 262.
2. There is nothing in this case to release plaintiff from the legal duty of paying the rent. Destruction of building by
fire is no defense. Bussmire v. Gunster,
72 Pa. 285; Hoy v. Holt; 91 Pa. 91.
VALENTINE for the defendant.

1. In theabsence of a special agreement,
the entry of the landlord to rebuild, even
with the consent of the tenant, suspends
the rent. MeGaw v. Lambert, 3 Pa. 444;
Hoeveter v. Fleming, 91 Pa. 322; Auer v.
Penn., 92 Pa. 446; Rriggs v. Thompson, 9
Pa. 340.
2. The plaintiff cannot recover for payments made when he was under no legal
obligation to pay.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The contract of the defendant was to
indemnify the plaintiff for any rent lie
would have to pay to his landlord while
the premises leased by him should be untenantable, if a fire should occur.
A fire did destroy the building occupied
by him, and six months elapsed before the
plaintiff was able again to occupy the
same. After the fire the landlord reconstructed the destroyed building.
The plaintiff, as tenant, voluntarily paid
JOHN CROWELL vs. AGE FIRE the rent during the period occupied by the
landlord in rebuilding. It is insisted that
INS. CO.
the entry of the landlord was an eviction
Insurance of leasehold-Entry of land- of the tenant or a rescission of the lease.
lord-Bent.
But this is not a contention between the
landlord and the tenant, as in McGaw v.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Lambert, 3 Pa. 444; Roeveter v. Fleming,
Crowell, a tenant for 5 years of a store 91 Pa. 322, and like cases cited by the defor which he was to pay $300 rent .yearly, fendant.
insured his leasehold interest with deCrowell had a perfect right to treat the
fendant for $2000,the defendant agreeing to tenancy as subsisting. He intended to
indemnify Crowell for any rent he had to reoccupy the store-room when the house
pay the landlord while the premises should was rebuilt. It was not necessary that
be untenantable because of any fire. there should be a formal written agreeShortly after a fire occurred. The land- ment that he should pay rent without
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interruption, as was made in the case of
Heller v. Royal Ins. Co., 177 Pa. 265.
In the present one, as well as in that,
the house was rebuilt and rent was paid
during the period required to accomplish
this, and the tenant also, when completed,
occupie'd the new building. It does not
appear that there was any collusive
arrangement entered into between the
plaintiff and his landlord for the purpose
of prejudicing the rights of the insurance company.
With the gratuity given by the landlord
to Crowell, the defendant had no concern.
It had nothing to do with the contract
bletween him and the insurance company.
The landlord did not intend to contribute
to the payment of the liability which the
latter was under to his tenant, and
the defendant cannot insist that such contribution shall be applied to the discharge
of any portion thereof.
The plaintiff is entitled to recover from
the defendant $150.
JOHN POOR vs. REBECCA TIMMINS.
Wills.
STATEMENT OP THE CASE.
Wm.Timmins bequeathed to his wife
one-half of all his personal estate, and the
rents and profits of a certain farm (describing it) during her natural lifetime,
and made her executrix. He devised the
farm after her death to his nephew John
Poor. The widow was, in fact, the owner
of the farm, having derived it by descent
from her father. Two-weeks after the death
of the husband she conveyed it to Rebecca
Timmins for $4,000. Three years later
she died, and this ejectment was brought
by Poor against her grantee. In settling
her account as executrix, the widow
charged herself with all the personal
estate, $2,500, and took credit for one-half
of the balance after meeting the expenses
of administration: viz. $1,050, "as legacy
under testator's will." The account was
duly confirmed 2 years before her death,
and distribution of the other half made
according to the will.
KERN and SHELLENBERGER for the
plaintiff.
KENNEDY and DEAL for the defendant.

1. One accepting a benefit under a will
is estopped from asserting a claim repugnant to its provisions. Cox v. Rogers, 77
Pa. 160; Zimmerman v. Lebo, 151 Pa. 345;
Watterson's appeal, 95 Pa. 312.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The principal question in this ease is:
did the widow by her acts, elect to take
against the will or to accept the provisions
of the will?
One of the strong points in this case is,
that the widow was the true owner of the
property, having received it from her
father, and, therefore, the husband was
devising a piece of land in which he had
no interest. But, nevertheless, had the
widow elected to take under the will, she
could not have afterwards set up her title
to the land, as she had then made her
election and was therefore bound by it.
That she elected to take against the
will was evidenced by the fact that
the sale of the land was made almost immediately after the death of the husband,
the testator; this fact, and the one just
above stated, will, I think, justify us in
finding that she elected to take against
the will.
Thus in Dickinson v. Dickinson, 61 Pa.
401, and Cox v. Rogers, 77 Pa. 160, it was
stated that, "Such election to be binding
must be evidenced by unequivocal acts,
clearly proved." We think that the act
of selling this property was an unequivocal
act to take against the will ; but it is contended, that if she elected to take against
the will she should not have taken out
letters testamentary. We admit that this
was not the correct method, but as there
were no children, she, the widow, was
entitled to one-half the personalty by law,
and as the granting of letters testamentary did no injury to the rest of the
distributees, and for which irregularity
we cannot set the sale aside, or permit the
plaintiff to recover when he has not been
injured thereby, we may safely come to
the conclusion that the sale was not
invalid, and, therefore, should be allowed
to stand. The law on this point is too well
settled and established to cite any cases
for our conclusion.
Then again, in Coal and Coke Co. v.
Boice, 165 Pa. 27, an action of ejectment
was brought for an undivided interest in
a certain piece of property, and the court
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held in that case that, "Ti le cannot be
under a will
a
benefit
lost by accepting
which disposes of land not the testator's
but the accepting legatee's, as against one
who purchases the interest of these legatees, not knowing of the acceptance."
Then again in Watterson's Appeal, 95
Pa. 312, it was stated that, "When a
widow has an independent title to property bequeathed, an election to take the
same under her husband's will must be
affirmatively established."
Again in Zimmerman v. Lebo, 151 Pa.
345, it was stated that, where an election
to take a gift under a will or deed, precludes the party electing from disputing
the power of the donor to dispose of other
property, in fact belonging to the accepting donee. See, also, Miller's Estate, 159
Ila. 574; Cumming's Estate, 153 Pa. 397;
Insurance Co. v. Stokes, 61 Pa. 466; Van
Dike's Appeal, 60 Pa. 481; Fulton v.
Moore, 25 Pa. 468; all these cases bear
directly or indirectly on the case at bar.
These cases just cited, and some others,
hold that where one accepts a benefit
under a will, he is estopped from disputing the prDvisions of. the will. But it
must be noted in this case, that the devisee has accepted no benefit to which she
was not entitled under the intestate law,
which entitled her to one-half the personalty, where there are no children and also
to letters of administration. How, then,
can it be said that her taking letters testamentary, and accounting as executrix,
has induced any one to actto his injury?
If this be so, how then can it be said that
the devisee and those claiming under her
are estopped.
After a careful perusal of the cases cited,
and some others, I think we can safely
come to the conclusion that the plaintiff's
case must utterly fail. Judgment for the
defendant, Rebeeca Timmins, must accordingly be rendered.
JAS. N. LIGHTNER, J.

The doctrine, that one who accepts a
benefit under a will is estopped from asserting a claim repugnant to its provisions,
is founded on equitable considerations,
and has been recognized and applied in
this State in many cases, beginning with
Stump et al. v. Findlay et al., 2 Rawle
168, and extending down to the present
time.
The only question in the case at bar is,
whether or not the conduct of the widow
of William Timmins amounts to acceptance of benefit under the will of her husband within the meaning of the doctrine'
as stated. That this isforthe court to determine is asserted in Cox et al. v. Rogers,
77 Pa. 160.. That case is of further interest

in that the facts are somewhat similar to
the case 'under consideration. There the
testator attempted to devise his wife's
farn to another, and by the same will
gave her the whole of the personal estate,
naming her as executrix. After the death
of the wife, her heirs claimed the farm;
but in an exhaustive opinion by Justice
Williams it was held, they were estopped
from so claiming by election of testator's
wife to take under the will, as evidenced,
First. By the following item of credit,
which appeared in the settlement of her
account, viz.: " By balance of personal
property retained by executrix, according
to the will."
Second. By the retention in fact of said
balance, and by using it as her own for a
long period of time.
Third. By the fact that the evidence
showed the declaration was made and
balance retained with full knowledge of
all the facts. In the case referred to it
was said that the election must be indicated by uneq uivocal acts clearly proven;
and to L binding must be made with full
knowledge of all the facts and burdens.
By what act, says Justice Williams, more
significant and unequivocal could she
have evidenced her election than by declaring she retained the personal property
according to the will, and using it as her
own while she lived ?
Is an election in the case at bar evidenced by such unequivocal acts? We
have practically the same declaration
made by the executrix in her account,
and the amount bequeathed by testator
has been appropriated and used by wife
as her own, but we can, however, attach
no significance to the latter fact, since the
said amount consists of one half of the
personalty, and this the widow would be
entitled to underthe intestate laws as well.
Is the declaration in the account alone
sufficient to charge the widow with an
election in favor of the will? We think
not, for there is equally as positive evidence indicative of a contrary intention,
viz.: sale of the farm to Rebecca Timmins.
The election, then, certainly cannot be
said to be evidenced by unequivocal facts
clearly proven; and since, in Cox v.
Rogers, the burden was held to be on the
party asserting the election, it follows that
if they fail in this particular, the widow
will be considered as not taking under the
will, and title of grantee is therefore good
as against present claimants.
Assuming that the wife did elect to take
under the will, the plaintiff s case, nevertheless, must fail, for there is no evidence
to show that in accepting the bequest of
one-half the personal property she knew
that she must conform to the other provisions of the will, and that she would be
estopped from claiming as her own the
farm devised.
W. B. YEAGER, J.

